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Prevent, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus: Analysing 




The work of Louis Althusser is well regarded in the study of ideology, having been used to 
analyse the material basis for ideology, and challenging the idea that ideology is simply a 
product of the mind. Recent advances in counterterrorism have seen many states adopting 
preventative programmes which are non-violent, and nominally voluntary, attempting to 
deradicalize or steer subjects away from radical ideologies, in an attempt to stem terrorist 
recruits. Many of these programmes claim not to be ideological. Prevent, which is the UK’s 
preventative counterterrorism programme, claims not to be ideological, but rather only 
concerned with stopping extremist ideologies. Using Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatus 
(ISA) framework, this article explores the ideological and material basis of Prevent, arguing 
that while Prevent assures us of its non-ideological nature, at its core is a programme that is 
part of the reproductive ideological apparatus of the state. 
 




Counterterrorism laws and policies in the UK have become mainstreamed and consistently 
frame ideology as inherently violent and causal in terrorist action.1 However, the debate about 
the role of ideology has been one-sided. The ideologies of extremists and terrorists are well 
explored and are commonly linked to a negative political and cultural milieu.2 This is 
reproduced at the elite and policy level. Yet there is little acknowledgement that 
counterterrorism policies themselves are driven by the ideologies of the incumbent elites. As 
Faller points out, ideology forms part of every culture and is actively concerned with the 
establishment and defence of patterns of beliefs and values. The state plays a key role in their 
reproduction. 3   
 
This article looks at Prevent, which is part of the UK’s counterterrorism strategy CONTEST. 
Contrary to “war” strategies of counterterrorism that use violence to suppress terrorist activity, 
Prevent is a voluntary programme. It is concerned with preventing people from getting 
involved in or supporting terrorism and is most concerned with extreme ideologies and 
people’s vulnerability to them. Community support projects, public communications, 
individual interventions, and a public duty to be aware of, and report any concerns about so-
called vulnerability to support terrorism are all crucial aspects of prevention. Despite being a 
softer policy, Prevent has attracted criticism, with several scholars accusing Prevent of being 
racist, Islamophobic, “thought policing”, and counter to democratic ideals. Those who work 
 
1 Jessie Blackbourn, Fiona De Londras, and Lydia Morgan, Accountability and Review in the Counter-Terrorist 
State (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2020). 
2 Richard Jackson, ‘The Political Necessity of Terrorism’, in BISA Annual Conference 2007 (British 
International Studies Association, Cambridge, 2007), 
https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/departmental/interpol/csrv/political-necessity-of-terrorism-richard-4.pdf. 
3 Lloyd Fallers, ‘Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism1’, American Anthropologist 63, no. 4 (1961): 
678–79, https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1961.63.4.02a00010. 
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on the policy contest the accuracy of these claims.4 They counter that violence is something 
which has long been considered unacceptable in political activism, and that Prevent is simply 
about “safeguarding”. They argue that this prevents vulnerable individuals from engaging in 
activities that are harmful to themselves and others. According to this argument, Prevent is akin 
to child protection or drug safeguarding policies. In this sense, Prevent claims not to be 
ideological or political, and certainly not concerned with “thought policing”. Indeed many 
activities undertaken by Prevent officers are explicitly non-political and focus on a myriad of 
seemingly innocuous activities, such as developing sport, art and entrepreneurship in 
communities. Where Prevent works to steer persons away from ideologies deemed extremist, 
it claims to not be steering people towards anything in particular.  
 
This article contends that despite claims to the contrary, Prevent is ideological. However, 
Prevent works hard to appear non-ideological, making the study of ideology in Prevent 
difficult. This study explores the relationship between ideology and Prevent using Althusser’s 
theory of the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). Althusser’s theory examines how non-violent 
state institutions create subjects and thus shape how we see the world. It also looks at the 
material practices that constitute those ideologies. This theory is particularly useful in 
analysing the activities of Prevent, as it allows us to see how material practices can result in 
ideological interpellation and highlights how seemingly non-ideological activities, such as 
safeguarding, can actually be part of the ideological practice of the state. We argue that through 
Althusser, Prevent can be seen in all its facets as an ideological policy. This allows us to 
robustly challenge the idea that Prevent is just about safeguarding, and that Prevent’s insistence 
that ideology is a problem of extremists is facile. 
 
The article also engages with some of the developments of Althusser’s theory, especially about 
whether an interpellated turn is coerced or not. We find that interpellation can be coerced, but 
that this is not the only way that interpellation happens. Interpellation also makes an offer to 
the subject-to-be, incentivising a turn. The article begins with an exploration of the role of 
ideology in counterterrorism and Prevent, before outlining Althusser’s theory of the ISA. 
Following this, we look at key aspects of the ISA theory and relate these to key parts of the 
Prevent policy. We explore how British values and Prevent training creates miscognition; how 
the Prevent duty and Channel interventions inscribe ideology in material processes; and how 
public communications and referrals Prevent interpellate subjects.  
 
Whither ideology in counterterrorism? 
 
Most commonly, ideology is thought of as a collection of ideas about the world and how it 
should be organized. Coherence is an important aspect of ideology as it refers to, at the very 
least, a set of ideas that are bound together. ‘One might add, as corollaries, contrast and stability 
– the one implying coherence vis-à-vis competing ideologies and the other implying coherence 
through time’.5 Broadly ideology can be defined as the way a system, individuals, groups and 
even a whole society, make sense of the world around them, rationalising their behaviour. 
Ideologies do not have to be rational or practical - indeed they can be delusional. But they still 
share the characteristics of coherence and temporal stability.6 
 
4 Sara Khan and Tony McMahon, The Battle for British Islam: Reclaiming Muslim Identity from Extremism 
(London: Saqi, 2016). 
5 John Gerring, ‘Ideology: A Definitional Analysis’, Political Research Quarterly 50, no. December (1997): 
957–94. 
6 Kathleen Knight, ‘Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century’, American Political 
Science Review 100, no. 4 (2006): 619–26. 
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This analysis, alongside the works of Freeden,7 Sartori,8  and Mullins,9 provide a descriptive 
account of ideology in the political world.  This descriptive tradition looks at what ideology 
says and is, but less at what it does. This contrasts with the critical tradition,10 which 
understands ideology as a series of discourses that support power, although not necessarily 
related to truth or falsehood. In this model, ideology is productive, in that it produces subjects, 
relations, and modes of being.11 While both models are useful in understanding the social 
world, this article uses the latter mode of analysis. As noted, Prevent works hard to mask 
ideology in its actions, appearing as often as it can as entirely neutral to any descriptive of 
ideology. 
 
Prevent is one of the four Ps (Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare) of the UK counterterrorism 
strategy CONTEST.12 Prevent is concerned with persons who have not yet crossed the criminal 
threshold and looks to prevent them from doing so. There have been several revisions to the 
Prevent strategy. Broadly, the overall objectives of the Prevent policy have remained the same 
and are to: 
 
• respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism (on and offline); 
• prevent people being drawn into terrorism and ensure they are given the proper 
advice and support;  
• re-enforce safeguarding at the heart of Prevent; and  
• work with a wide range of sectors and institutions … where there are risks of 
radicalization.13 
 
Prevent seeks to achieve these objectives through a range of interventions, including the 
promotion of British values, including democracy, rule of law, liberty and tolerance; an array 
of local programmes seeking to transform the culture and politics of targeted communities to 
increase “resilience” to extremist ideas; and working with individuals reported to be showing 
signs of radicalization under the Channel programme.14 The government also introduced a 
statutory duty upon public institutions to report individuals to the Prevent who are suspected 
of showing signs of radicalisation.15 The 2018 Prevent strategy also works with terrorism 
offenders, trying to deradicalize or disengage them from terrorist activity. The focus on 
ideology and intervention is described by practitioners as “safeguarding”, softening the edge 
of the interventions. These interventions are nominally voluntary, although those who refuse 
 
7 Michael Freeden, ‘Ideology and Political Theory’, Journal of Political Ideologies 11, no. 1 (2006): 3–22. 
8 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems’, American Political Science Review 63, no. 2 
(1969): 398–411. 
9 Willard Mullins, ‘On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science’, American Sociological Review 66, no. 2 
(1972): 498–510. 
10 Mark Bevir, ‘Ideology as Distorted Belief’, Journal of Political Ideologies 1, no. 2 (1996): 107–22. 
11 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 2007). 
12 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (CM 9608) (London: 
Stationery Office, 2018). 
13 Ibid.; HM Government, Prevent Strategy (CM 8092) (London: Stationary Office, 2011); HM Government, 
‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism’ (London: HMSO, 2009). 
14 HM Government, Prevent Strategy (CM 8092). 
15 Home Office, ‘Statutory Guidance - Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: For England and Wales’, Gov.uk, 2019, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance/revised-prevent-duty-guidance-for-
england-and-wales; Caitlin Mastroe, ‘Evaluating CVE: Understanding the Recent Changes to the United 
Kingdom’s Implementation of Prevent’, Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 2 (2016): 50–60. 
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to engage might be referred to other services, including the police.16 Many Prevent practitioners 
state that they are looking for a soft approach that does not scare, does not intimidate, and 
encourages people to report their suspicions without fear of criminalising someone.17 
 
While responding to ideology is in the objectives of Prevent, making it key to the policy, it also 
holds a strange place in this framework. It is named as a key driver of the terrorist threat by 
Prevent.18 Police forces have produced documents that profile what they consider to be extreme 
ideologies at length.19 Statistical bulletins also track the ideological character of individuals 
referred to Prevent.20 Training modules are made available which give safeguarding 
professionals further insight into ideology.21 Mentors with a similar ideological background 
are assigned to individuals referred to Prevent so that they can better relate to one another, or 
explain why the thoughts of the referrals are an ideological distortion.22 
 
The process of becoming involved in terrorism, known as radicalization, is also inextricably 
linked to ideology in Prevent. While radicalization is thought to be an important driver for 
getting involved in terrorism in the wider literature and is associated with several different 
contested factors,23 in Prevent it is framed more simply as the process of adopting an extremist 
ideology. For instance, it is described in the 2011 Prevent strategy as ‘the process by which a 
person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.’24 The 
Counter-Extremism strategy similarly defines the process where ‘a vulnerable person will be 
introduced to an extremist ideology by a radicalising influencer … [who] draws the vulnerable 
individual ever closer to extremism.’25 Thus, in Prevent radicalization is not sufficient in 
causing terrorism. However, ideology is. This idea is cemented in public discourse.26  
 
While the apparatus of British counterterrorism is obsessed with ideology, it is also in denial 
of it. Ideology holds a key place in the theoretical framework of radicalization that is at the 
core of Prevent, but is missing from the counterthrust. The alternatives to extreme ideologies 
are not the ideologies of the British state, liberal-democratic-capitalism. Instead of the ideology 
 
16 Valentina Bartolucci and Joshua Skoczylis, ‘The Practice of Counterterrorism in the United Kingdom and Its 
Sociopolitical Effects’, in The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Studies, ed. Scott Romaniuk 
et al. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 337–54. 
17 Joshua Skoczylis, ‘The Local Prevention of Terrorism in Strategy and Practice: “Contest” a New Era in the 
Fight against Terrorism’ (PhD thesis, Leeds, University of Leeds, 2013). 
18 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (CM 9608). 
19 Counter Terrorism Policing South East, ‘Safeguarding Young People and Adults from Ideological 
Extremism’, OSCB, 2019, https://www.oscb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Safeguarding-from-
Radicalisation-Reference-Guide.pdf. 




21 Home Office, ‘Prevent: Training Catalogue’ (London, 2016), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/503973/Pr
event_Training_catalogue_-_March_2016.pdf. 
22 Tom Pettinger, ‘British Terrorism Preemption: Subjectivity and Disjuncture in Channel “De‐radicalization” 
Interventions’, British Journal of Sociology Online First (2020). 
23 A Schmid, Radicalization, De-Radicalization, Counter-Radicalization: A Conceptual Discussion and 
Literature Review (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013). 
24 HM Government, Prevent Strategy (CM 8092). 
25 HM Government, Counter-Extremism Strategy (CM 9148) (London: Stationary Office, 2015). 
26 Basil Germond, Tony McEnery, and Anna Marchi, ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach as the Dominant 
Discourse: A Corpus-Linguistics Analysis of the EU’s Counter-Piracy Narrative’, European Foreign Affairs 
Review 21, no. 1 (2016): 150. 
 5 
of the British state, we have British values, which include democracy, tolerance, and rule of 
law.27 These values are framed as natural. To deviate from these is to be an extremist, and to 
become associated with an extremist ideology. But one is found with an ideology only at this 
point. Even those who Prevent tries to deradicalize or disengage from extreme ideologies are 
not expected to adopt a new ideology. They are simply expected to reduce their vulnerability 
to extreme ideologies by engaging in normal, productive lives within the confines of British 





That Prevent understands ideology as a key driving force in political violence but does not 
consider its work to be ideological, presents a puzzle. While it presents itself as non-
ideological, Prevent is working on behalf of what Jameson calls the dominant ideology,29 
competing against emergent and residual ideological formations. Those competing formations 
damage the state order as they become influential, putting production and reproduction at risk. 
Thus, while promoting the dominant ideology, the state also must suppress these competing 
formations. How it does so is not always explicit and suppressing emergent and residual 
formations do not always mean actively promoting dominant ideological thought. Cynical or 
passive subjectivities equally serve the state in that they allow for the continuation of the status 
quo with little resistance.30 
 
Prevent is part of a wider movement shifting from the war model of counterterrorism to a 
preventative criminal justice model. This has entailed a movement from repression to 
engagement, attempting to get people on side with policing efforts.31 The war model, mostly 
used abroad but also in Northern Ireland, advocates the use of maximum force, and often 
involves the military, intelligence agents embedded in paramilitary groups, extrajudicial 
murder and imprisonment, and coercing civilians to supply intelligence.32 However, this 
approach was not deemed appropriate or politically viable domestically. However, aspects of 
colonial policing which included the “hearts and minds” approach developed in Malaya and 
the use of community intelligence in Northern Ireland transferred well from the colony to the 
metropole.33 Thus, the move to preventative models means that the more coercive aspects of 
counterterrorism policing are separated from ideological work. This makes it seem less like 
ideas are being policed, and therefore more like it is free, democratic competition in the polis. 
However, despite this masking, we must recognise that counterterrorism is as much an exercise 
 
27 HM Government, Prevent Strategy (CM 8092), 107. 
28 Amy Thornton and Noémie Bouhana, ‘Preventing Radicalization in the UK: Expanding the Knowledge-Base 
on the Channel Programme’, Policing 13, no. 3 (2019): 331–44. 
29 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1991), 6. 
30 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 1988). 
31 Ronald Crelinsten, ‘The Discourse and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Liberal Democracies’, Australian 
Journal of Politics & History 44, no. 3 (1998): 389–413, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8497.00028; Joshua 
Skoczylis, The Local Prevention of Terrorism: Strategy and Practice in the Fight against Terrorism 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
32 Noah Feldman, ‘Choices of Law, Choices of War’, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 25, no. 2 
(2002): 457–70; Rory Finegan, ‘Shadowboxing in the Dark: Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism in Northern 
Ireland’, Terrorism and Political Violence 28, no. 3 (2016): 497–519. 
33 Abdul Razak, Javaid Rehman, and Joshua Skoczylis, ‘“Prevent” Policies and Laws: A Comparative Survey of 
the UK, Malaysia, and Pakistan’, in Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism, ed. Genevieve Lennon and 
Clive Walker (London: Routledge, 2015), 380–96; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: 
Penguin Books, 2017). 
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in legitimacy and consent as it is in deterrence and security practice.34 It is about taming 
terrorism and extremism by creating an overarching narrative that legitimises state attempts to 
choreograph dissent against the status quo and the notion of national exceptionalism, identity, 
and nationhood.35 
 
While Prevent is focused on ideology, it is only focused on terrorist or extremist ideology. Its 
own ideology is obscured. This obfuscation hides an apparatus of ideology – winning hearts 
and minds is about winning legitimacy and support for the state and the way it functions. By 
hiding its own ideology, Prevent is removing the possibility of contestation. The shifting of 
ideology away from the political contest and towards a social understanding of it being a simple 
catalyst for violence supports ideological reproduction.36 This creates  
 
the notion of a subject morally and criminally fully responsible for his acts [which] 
clearly serves the ideological need to conceal the intricate, always-already operative 
texture of historico-discursive presuppositions that not only provide the context for the 
subject’s act but also define in advance the co-ordinates of its meaning: the system can 
function only if the cause of its malfunction can be located in the responsible subject’s 
guilt.37 
 
Hiding ideology allows the state to argue that counterterrorism is about keeping the public safe. 
That is, it is for your good that you must keep a watchful eye on your neighbours, your family, 
and your friends. Otherwise, innocents will be harmed in acts of violence, and in modern 
society, we agree that violence is bad. However, while ideology remains hidden, it is there. As 
Žižek argues, non-ideology is impossible because we always need a psychic, political 
framework for understanding a fundamentally unknowable world.38 ‘Ideologies are the 
thought-products par excellence of the political sphere: they are necessary, normal and they 
facilitate (and reflect) political action.’39 
 
The Ideological State Apparatus 
 
Although Prevent largely ignores ideology, except as a catalyst for violence, Althusser argues 
that all non-violent state apparatus’ must be saturated with ideology. This is because states that 
do not try to reproduce themselves ideologically will not last long.  They do not just need to 
reproduce the skills necessary to maintain production; they also need to reproduce the 
relationships and ideas that sustain the established order. Ideology needs to be reproduced. This 
is done through two mechanisms, known as the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) and the 
Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). The former consists of those instruments of violence that 
can coerce compliance upon an unwilling subject, including the police and the army. These 
might maintain the relationships of production but do not create subjects that accede to 
relationships of power. Violence might pacify populations, but does little to create recognition, 
creating insecure systems. This is akin to the “war” model of counterterrorism that has been 
 
34 Peter Neumann, Old and New Terrorism: Late Modernity, Globalization and the Transformation of Political 
Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009). 
35 Joshua Skoczylis and Sam Andrews, ‘Can Prevent Be Saved? No, But ...’, Critical Social Policy 40, no. 3 
(2020): 350–69. 
36 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. (London: Verso, 2008). 
37 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology.’, in Mapping Ideology, ed. slavoj Žižek (London: Verso 
Books, 2012), 5. 
38 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. 
39 Freeden, ‘Ideology and Political Theory’. 
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deemed inappropriate for domestic counterterrorism. Secure political systems are instead 
created when subjects recognise themselves within the political order and reproduce it. ISAs 
have an important function in that they seek to create a subject that complies by their own 
volition. It is formed of schools, churches, trade unions, the family, and other non-violent social 
institutions.  
 
Althusser argues that these ISAs function through interpellation and miscognition. 
Interpellation is famously described as the process where an individual becomes a subject when 
they recognise themselves in the call of a police officer. When the officer shouts, “Hey! You!”, 
the individual recognises that they are the subject of the call, and a subject that complies with 
the ideology implicit in the call. They then come to exist within the law as that subject.4041  
Thus interpellation is a process of encountering and internalising cultural values. This 
internalisation is, however, not yours alone but requires a response and demands an openness 
to being interpellated by another’s address,42 ‘and it is predicated on the acknowledgement of 
the contestability of claims represented.’43 However, as the subject is always-already a subject, 
and because the ideology that they are interpellated into is one of the discrete relationships 
where “everything really is so”, even though it never can be, the subject suffers miscognition.44 
They recognise truth where there cannot be any, with ideology providing something that 
‘makes sense of what does not make sense.’45 In doing so it conceals the very real 
contradictions that we live within our everyday lives46 and cloaks the Real with a cohesive 
reality.47 
 
Importantly, Althusser notes that these functions are material, and not solely confined to the 
Real or the Imaginary. Practices and apparatus work to produce and reproduce ideology. Thus 
things like traditions, school lessons, marriage vows, jobs and rituals reproduce ideology, 
whether we want them to or not. He invokes Pascal here, noting that a Christian is made not 
through belief, but through the action of prayer. ‘Kneel down, move your lips, and you will 
believe.’48 This results in subjects who ‘do not know it, but … are doing it [or at the very least] 
they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it.’49 In some sense, these 
material acts are performative, in that they are a ‘set of repeated acts within a highly rigid 
regulatory frame that set over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of 
being.’50 Thus, subjects are not always created through belief; or at least, belief is not 
necessarily the intended result of all ISAs. While for some belief might be more important, in 
the main Althusser seems to argue that in fact, the primary function of the ISA is in trapping 
the individual in a web of relations within which they have no choice but to act as if they 
believe. Through this acting, they then come to believe and are fully interpellated as subjects. 
Writing on race, Wekker states that it ‘is not only a matter of ideology, beliefs and statements 
 
40 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 
41 Ibid. Here, Butler refers to law not necessarily as judicial law, but rather as structures of power that discipline 
and shape us as subjects. 
42 Athena Athanasiou, Agonistic Mourning (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 244. 
43 Mónica Brito Vieira, ‘Representing Silence in Politics’, American Political Science Review 114, no. 4 (2020): 
983. 
44 Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (London ; 
New York: Verso, 2014). 
45 Tony Myers, Slavoj Žižek Routledge Critical Thinkers. (London, New York: Routledge, 2003). 
46 Karl Marx, Capital: Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 (London: Penguin Classics, 
1976). 
47 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. 
48 Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism. 
49 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. 
50 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
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[but] also becomes transparent in practices, in the way things are organized and done.’51 Thus, 
race is made real not just through racial ideologies, but through the enactment of those 
ideologies in state practice. Through this material process ‘subjects are implicated in relations 
of power but … are also enabled by them’52. These functions also reinforce each other. When 
one replies to the policeman’s call,53 you are following the ritual which ‘is an expression/effect 
of your inner belief; in short, the external ritual performatively generates its own ideological 
foundation.’54 Thus, through answering the call, one recognises the authority of the police 
officer’s place as a subject in an overarching ideology.  
 
Althusser’s theory, while influential, has not been without criticism. Initially, it seems that the 
interpellating call is irresistible, as even a rejection of the call functions as a form of 
recognition, as it recognises the call as part of a cohesive ideological system. An ignorant turn 
– that is, a turn without knowledge of the caller - also brings the subject into an order, whether 
they know it or not. This has faced criticism for its universality, resulting in situations where 
even militant trade unions are seen as part of an ideological apparatus of the state. The “turn” 
itself is also something that has generated debate. Eagleton and Dolar note that for the target 
to receive the hail, they already have to be a subject 55. Others have debated how the hail works, 
and why a person would answer.56 Butler considers this a question of coercion and argues that 
Althusser made the interpellating agent a police officer to signify the threat of force implicit in 
interpellation.57 Žižek, while adopting Althusser’s framework and many of his ideas, finds a 
weak point in that Althusser never succeeded in ‘thinking out the link between Ideological 
State Apparatuses and ideological interpellation.’58 Thus Althusser does not explain how 
subjects come to interiorise the effects of interpellation.59 As such, there is some disagreement 
about how we should fill in the gaps within Althusser’s theory.  
 
These criticisms are important to address, as the resolution to these questions has implications 
for theory. While there is some coercion implicit within the call, this is not the only cause for 
the interpellated turn. The call is primarily an offer. The offer is to be within the system; to be 
recognised, and to be allowed to reform and become accepted if one was not before. As noted, 
Prevent – and most ISAs – are nominally voluntary, and so coercion cannot be the primary 
reason for an interpellated turn. Therefore we follow more closely the arguments of Althusser, 
rather than Butler, in that the subject turns because it wants to be a subject, not (just) because 
it is forced. This goes hand in hand with what Žižek, following Lacan, calls the Real, which is 
the totalization of reality that can never be properly understood or symbolized, and thus 
compels us towards metaphysical or ideological explanations for our lives and existence.60 
Resch notes this theory, and Lacan’s psychoanalytic framework in general, corresponds with 
 
51 Gloria Wekker, White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 
2016), 50. 
52 Sara Salih, Judith Butler (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002). 
53 Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism. 
54 Žižek, ‘Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology.’ 
55 Mladen Dolar, ‘Beyond Interpellation’, Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences 6, no. 2 (1993): 
75–96; Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 2007). 
56 Matthew Lampert, ‘Resisting Ideology: On Butler’s Critique of Althusser’, Diacritics 43, no. 2 (2015); James 
Martel, ‘When the Call Is Not Meant for You: Misinterpellation, Subjectivity, and the Law’, Philosophy & 
Rhetoric 48, no. 4 (2015): 494–515. 
57 Judith Butler, ‘Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All.’, Yale French Studies 88 (1995): 6–26. 
58 Agon Hamza, ‘The Sublime Absolute: Althusser, Žižek, and the Critique of Ideology’, in Žižek and Media 
Studies, ed. Matthew Flisfeder and Louis-Paul Willis (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 33. 
59 Henry Krips, ‘Ideology and Its Pleasures: Althusser, Žižek & Pfaller’, Continental Thought and Theory: A 
Journal of Intellectual Freedom 2, no. 1 (2018): 333–67. 
60 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. 
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Althusser’s theory of the ISA and thus provides a further interesting explanation for why a 
subject might turn – we simply want answers.61  
 
As for whether a subject needs to exist to hear the call, it makes sense that to recognise one’s 
self in the call, the call itself needs to be understood. It is inconceivable that an interpellation 
could occur in the context of a call to or from something completely alien. To be interpellated, 
one needs to understand where one belongs within the symbolic framework that the 
interpellation exists within. Despite a previous disagreement with Butler, the concept of the 
always-already subject is nicely complemented by Butler’s work on gender.6263 Butler explores 
how gender functions as a disciplinary framework, placing the individual within the context of 
social expectation of gender. This subject is also treated as always-already. For instance, Butler 
explores how at birth, the medical team will announce “it’s a boy!” or, “it’s a girl!”, and 
therefore inaugurate the individual as a subject. However, the baby has no concept of 
subjectification here. The baby has no real understanding of language at birth. However, while 
the gender is inscribed upon the baby, it is the parents or legal guardians of the child that inherit 
this inscription until the point where the child can understand what the assignment of gender 
means. In this sense, the always-already subject is more a subject who inherits subjectivity later 
in life. Some social agent is simply holding it for them until they reach the point where they 
can accept it, or otherwise have it forced upon them. Once understood they formally enter into 
the symbolic arena. As Martel explains, interpellation reaches both backwards and forwards in 
time. A successful interpellation does not tell us we are a subject now, but rather always-already 
was a subject, but perhaps did not know it yet.64 Actions we have taken previously are 
reinterpreted as the actions of an unknown subject-to-be. This has implications for those 
referred to Prevent. An accepted Channel intervention is a recasting of one’s life to that point 
as always-already being extreme, even if it was not understood as such before.  
 
 
Ideology in practice: Prevent 
 
Prevent is, arguably, the ISA form of counterterrorism in the UK, specifically involving 
ideological interventions to form subjects and to re-form those who turn away from the 
interpellation of the state. As outlined above, we would expect to see interpellation, 
miscognition, and the materiality of the ideology embedded within this policy. This section 
explores how Prevent fits into this framework, and whether the study of the Prevent policy can 
be used to develop the ISA framework.  
 
Miscognition: British Values and Prevent Training 
 
As mentioned above, Prevent defines extremism in relation to British values.65 These include 
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs.’66 The teaching of these values has become mandatory in schools, and the 
Prevent duty also places an obligation on public institutions to pay “due regard” to Prevent, 
 
61 Paul Resch, Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1992). 
62 Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. 
63 Ibid.; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2006). 
64 Martel, ‘When the Call Is Not Meant for You: Misinterpellation, Subjectivity, and the Law’. 
65 HM Government, ‘Counter-Extremism Strategy’ (London: HMSO, 2015), 9. 
66 HM Government, Prevent Strategy (CM 8092), 107. 
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embedding counterterrorism within health, education, social care, prisons, and local 
authorities.67 Defining extremism in relation to these values, however, does not create a 
cohesive definition, as much of what is held to be British values are in fact contestable and 
contested concepts. Thus, the lines between extremism and “acceptable” politics are fluid, and 
the fact that it is unclear where the dividing line between extremism and moderation lies creates 
a constant threat of being labelled a deviant.  
 
This makes teaching British values in schools problematic. However, defining extremism is 
not the primary purpose of this work. While there is some discussion of extremism, much of 
the work here focuses instead on promoting tolerance, critical thinking, and debate. The legal 
duty to teach these values has resulted in embedding British values into the national curriculum 
and ensuring that it is taught across all levels, including at nurseries and primary schools.68 
Some have argued that the promotion of these very values is  
 
an attempt to depoliticize discussion of the values and standards that underpin public life 
in the UK and the extent to which they are upheld. [Fundamental British Values] 
encourage an unquestioning view of the nation as the most salient community.69  
 
Indeed, this taps into the myth of British nationhood, which is a narrative of half-truths about 
the origins, identity, and purpose of this nation. These constitute an integral part of the 
ideological foundation of nations and nationalism.70 Richardson argues that the embedding of 
these values into education is an attempt on behalf of the government to ‘give a convincing and 
inspiring lead on issues of national identity and narrative, and to signal that it understands the 
population’s anxieties and can be trusted to deal with them.’71 British values do this by creating 
a favourable narrative of British history, positioned against the other that threatens it.72 This 
fixation on Britishness generates suspicion towards the other and those who challenge it,73 and 
celebrate nationalism and visions of a white ethno-Christian identity.74 
 
More broadly, public sector workers are mandated to pay due regard to Prevent. Usually, this 
means having an institutional Prevent lead and taking some form of training. One common 
form of training is the Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training offered by 
the Home Office. WRAP is used to train people in a public-facing role to spot vulnerabilities 
 
67 Clive Walker and Jessie Blackbourn, ‘Interdiction and Indoctrination: The Counter‐Terrorism and Security 
Act 2015’, Modern Law Review 79, no. 5 (2016): 840–70. 
68 Department of Education, ‘Promoting Fundamental British Values as Part of SMSC in Schools: Departmental 
Advice for Maintained Schools’ (London, 2014), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/380595/S
MSC_Guidance_Maintained_Schools.pdf; The Key, ‘Promoting British Values in Schools’, The Key for 
School Governors, 2020, https://schoolgovernors.thekeysupport.com/school-improvement-and-
strategy/strategic-planning/values-ethos/promoting-british-values-in-schools/. 
69 Hugh Starkey, ‘Fundamental British Values and Citizenship Education: Tensions between National and 
Global Perspectives’, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 100, no. 2 (2018): 149–62, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/04353684.2018.1434420. 
70 Yinan He, ‘National Mythmaking and the Problems of History In Sino-Japanese Relations’ (Conference on 
Memory of War, Boston: MIT.edu, 2003), http://web.mit.edu/rpeters/papers/yinan_sino-japanese.pdf. 
71 Robin Richardson, ‘British Values and British Identity: Muddles, Mixtures, and Ways Ahead’, London 
Review of Education 13, no. 2 (2015): 39, https://doi.org/10.18546/LRE.13.2.04. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Joshua Skoczylis, ‘Counterterrorism and Society: The Contradiction of the Surveillance State - Understanding 
the Relationship among Communities, State Authorities, and Society’, in Palgrave Handbook of Global 
Counterterrorism, ed. Romaniuk, Scott et al. (London: Palgrave, 2017), 117–34. 
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that might make someone susceptible to terrorist “grooming” and to report individuals assessed 
as vulnerable to Prevent. The training is now ‘a core part of the professional lives of, for 
instance, teachers, social workers and healthcare practitioners,75 meeting part of the Prevent 
statutory duty. Over 1.1 million people have completed the Home Office training by 2018. 
Perhaps surprisingly, this training has little to do with ideology. Training is less about 
understanding extremism and terrorism, and more about spotting and referring vulnerable 
individuals to Prevent, where an assessment will be made. As Thomas notes, ‘we don’t need 
to understand the ideologies or ideas that are promoted, more the way they work to hook in the 
vulnerable.’76 Indeed, much of the Prevent training encourages the idea that people who get 
involved in terrorism or extremism, or who come to support it, are not choosing of their own 
volition. They are instead being groomed, a process which is explicitly compared with the 
process of manipulating minors into having sex with adults.77 This assumption ends up 
removing agency from the individual, assuming that ‘[t]hose who are radicalised often lack the 
intellectual challenge to effectively question the falsehoods in terrorist propaganda.’78 
 
The training then becomes more of a technical exercise in apophasis, where spotting 
vulnerability simply traces ‘the contours of what you will not mention.’79  This is not, of course, 
to say that understanding ideology plays no part in Prevent. CONTEST directly names far-
right and Islamist terrorism as the greatest threat to the United Kingdom and Prevent e-training 
repeatedly talks about signs, symbols, tropes of various ideologies.80 However, while the 
strategy understands ideology as a prime driver of terrorism it goes on to state that ‘[t]here is 
no precise line between what we have described above as terrorist ideology, and what we 
consider extremist ideology.’81 Thus understanding about ideology is presented as 
supplementary to the knowledge of vulnerability – the function of it is as a marker of something 
being wrong, a symptom, rather than a thing worthy of real critique or understanding.82 
Concerning British values, we are encouraged to look at someone with a divergent ideology 
and know simply that we are right and that there is something wrong that needs to be fixed. 
The exact diagnosis of the function of ideology and the nature of the sickness is left to Prevent 
professionals, displacing the job of ideological critique from civil society to the government.  
 
Both British values and the Prevent training can be seen as exercises in miscognition. Althusser 
notes that as interpellation situates us as subjects, we then fail to recognise the real conditions 
of the society in which we live. Through this miscognition 
 
75 Thomas Martin, ‘Identifying Potential Terrorists: Visuality, Security and the Channel Project’, Security 
Dialogue, 24 May 2018, 096701061877007, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010618770070. 
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it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that 'men' 'represent to 
themselves' in ideology, but above all, it is their relation to these conditions of existence 
that is represented to them there. … What is represented in ideology is therefore not the 
system of real relations that govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary 
relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live.83 
 
Through Prevent, miscognition is achieved. Via British values, Prevent creates a narrative of 
British exceptionalism, a nation that holds only “good” values such as tolerance, respect for 
democracy and the rule of law. Britain’s long and bloody history is obscured and hidden from 
plain sight. Little is said about slavery, colonialism, racism, and the suppression of minority 
rights in their historical and modern context. Raising these subjects in public is regarded as 
unpatriotic.84 Thus we imagine ourselves inaccurately, creating a cohesive ideal through which 
truth remains untold.85  
 
Studies of British values in schools found that many of the lessons create a narrative of an 
inclusive Britain by addressing issues such as racism through a liberal lens. Martin Luther King 
Jr is discussed alongside the murder of Stephen Lawrence, with an emphasis on the benefits of 
multicultural and multiracial societies. But issues such as structural racism which might 
implicate the current system are ignored.86 This increases the possibility that minorities might 
feel alienated, with their negative experiences being subsumed into a more palatable narrative 
where racists are simply the “bad apples”, and the British state a fundamentally good actor with 
the interests of all citizens in mind.87 Crawford argues that this positions teachers as defenders 
of a ‘white hegemonic order’.88 Younis further argues that by positioning British values as 
fundamental to counterterrorism, it creates a strategy that encourages us to see dissent from 
mainstream Britishness as potentially extreme.89 Indeed, ‘Islam is constructed as threatening 
to the prevailing values in liberal democratic societies’,90 and thus this too has to be subsumed 
into British identity for it to be tamed. A number of the “hard conversations” that are 
encouraged in British values lessons include discussions on the role of violence in Islam, the 
nature of Jihad and whether the religion has been “warped” or “distorted” by extremists.91 As 
such it is noted by some scholars that many teachers see British values as being specifically 
targeted towards minorities – particularly Muslims - as a way of dragging them into the national 
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84 Julia Rone, ‘“Enemies of the People”? Diverging Discourses on Sovereignty in Media Coverage of Brexit’, 
British Politics Online First (2021). 
85 Kevin Tavin, ‘Six Acts of Miscognition: Implications for Art Education’, Studies in Art Education 53, no. 1 
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idea and ensuring that the correct, moderate Islam is followed.92 These examples give an 
overview of the nature of miscognition in Prevent – students are encouraged to rethink what it 
is to be “British” and adopt an idea of Britishness that is generally supportive of the state, 
liberal, but without too much criticism of state violence or too much expounding of the 
contradictions of British life. This is exacerbated by new guidance that sees anti-Capitalist 
teaching as extreme,93 and textbooks that illustrate state violence as being legitimate and non-
state violence as illegitimate.94 Students are also encouraged to rethink their own identities 
within the bounds of these ideas of Britishness. Real conditions of existence, such as structural 
racism, the nuances of history and theology, and the contradictions of capital and democracy, 
are discarded for miscognicised identity. 
 
Through Prevent training, others are also miscognized. The political decisions of others to 
consume, promote and engage with extremist material and groups are not seen as a decision 
made with a clear mind, concerning one’s own interests and political proclivities. If these 
decisions fall outside of the acceptable bounds of British values, then they are deemed 
extremist and become pathologized. In this framework, to be an extremist is to be unable to 
make agentic choices. Further, those who are not extremists but who might be vulnerable 
become suspicious. Although Prevent has broadened somewhat, to include the extreme far-
right,95 suspicion largely remains with Muslim communities.96 Thus through Prevent training, 
we are encouraged to think of others in over-simplified, psychologised, pathologized and 
largely incorrect ways. There is no space in Prevent training for clear-headed, political, and 
legitimate terrorism. Those fighting for national liberation for instance, or terrorists who fight 
for their power and imposition of their vision, are excluded. 
 
This training also masks the contradictions present within British society, in much the same 
way that British values do. British society still suffers from systemic racism, nationalism and 
far-right politics which are becoming increasingly prevalent.97 The government itself has also 
been accused of tapping into nationalistic sentiment and whipping up fear of migrants and 
religious minorities.98 However, there is little space in Prevent training for this kind of 
mainstream racism. As noted, the training does not cover ideologies in-depth and instead 
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encourages a pathologisation of extremism and a reliance on “gut feelings” about who might 
be a problem.99 As British society remains one within which Islam is seen as a threat, racism 
remains prevalent, and whiteness and Christianity remain the norm. Everyday bigotry 
including Islamophobia, transphobia, sexism, and racism are less likely to receive a referral as 
this is not deemed pathological. Thus while the training is neutral in that it does not tell anyone 
to be fearful of Muslims, the training exists in a wider environment in which Muslims are 
overwhelmingly associated with terrorism and extremism.100 Islamic extremism is still 
considered to be the greatest terrorist threat to Britain,101 and Prevent does not tell people to be 
suspicious of Muslims, but just to remember that extremism comes in all flavours, Muslims 
included. Through this, the identity and place of some in society becomes distorted, while that 
of others survives, and we begin to not only miscognise the extremist but also those who British 
society considers to be extreme, regardless of the accuracy of that label. 
 
Inscribing ideology in the material process: The Prevent Duty and Channel interventions 
 
According to Althusser, much of what Prevent does is material in that it is not just the relaying 
of ideas, but the embedding of these ideas in institutional structures. These institutions then 
create the conditions for the enactment of ideology, and through enactment, ideology is 
reproduced. This process can also be related to the idea of practices, as outlined in Practice 
Theory. Adler and Pouliot argue that practices are not just actions, but rather ‘socially 
meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, 
simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in 
and on the material world.’102 Thus, the work that is described above is a practice that gives 
materiality to Prevent. Since 2015 the Prevent duty has made engagement with Prevent 
mandatory in the public sector, including health, education and social work. Through the 
Prevent duty, the ideology embedded within Prevent has been absorbed into institutional 
structures and has become a part of essential services. 
 
 
The Prevent duty, which was introduced in 2015, requires public institutions to pay ‘due 
regard’ to Prevent. In practice, this means that some measure of training should be used to 
make public sector workers aware of Prevent, and means that these workers should report 
persons to Channel if they are suspicious that they might be vulnerable to radicalization.103  
They are required to report individuals who display “suspicious” behaviour either directly to 
safeguarding or Prevent officers, or through the ACT website.104 Many institutions will also 
have a Prevent lead and an internal reporting process. Staff are encouraged to follow their 
intuition when an individual arouses suspicion. There is little criticality with referrals and the 
securitisation approach to Prevent.105 This process has largely been accepted,106 and framing it 
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as safeguarding makes ‘the policy an inevitably more straightforward way to comply with the 
requirements.’107 This process is encouraged by the police and security sector.108 However, 
there are concerns that public sector workers are ill-equipped to understand issues surrounding 
extremism, and fail to take into account the experiences of Muslims and other minority 
groups.109 This is likely due to the poor level of training given to public sector workers on 
issues relating to extremism and terrorism, enforcing a perspective that ‘offers a simplistic one-
dimensional and, at best, an unhelpful contribution to resolving a complex and 
multidimensional problem.’110 However because Prevent has successfully been framed as 
safeguarding, an inability to understand extremism or to properly assess risk is overlooked by 
public sector workers.111 Thus teachers, healthcare professionals, and others subject to the duty, 
are encouraged to refer any suspicion they might have, which will be assessed by a professional 
112. Those who refer do not need to know what they are doing in this sense. They do not even 
need to believe that Prevent works – the act of referral becomes the moment in which 
ideological inscription occurs. If a referral is deemed to be risky, then that person is taken on 
as a potential extremist or terrorist, thus confirming the rightness of the action. Like Pascal’s 
prayer, public sector workers refer, and then believe.   
 
When a referral is received, the person referred is then assessed by Prevent, and if deemed 
suitability vulnerable, their case will be discussed at a Channel panel to decide what to do. As 
noted previously, Channel attempts to intervene and prevent individuals who are assessed by a 
panel as being vulnerable to supporting terrorism from actually engaging in the support of or 
engagement in terrorism. In this sense Prevent ‘does not merely seek to stop someone from 
committing an act of terrorism, it seeks to stop individuals from becoming engaged in terrorism 
in the first place.’113 While making Prevent referrals is encouraged little is known about what 
happens within Channel.114 What is known is largely taken from cases relayed directly by 
Prevent professionals, and reviews of failed cases.115 While these cases cannot be generalized, 
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they nonetheless illustrate how Prevent functions at this level. William Baldét, a former Prevent 
Officer for Leicestershire highlighted the case of an eleven-year-old boy who was referred to 
Channel for revering Osama bin Laden and claiming that killing non-Muslims was acceptable. 
The Prevent investigation uncovered that his father had left, and that he was the main carer for 
his mentally ill mother. He was also being bullied at school. It was concluded that ‘significant 
changes in his behaviour and provocative statements were a symptom of this and a cry for 
help’116 and his extreme statements were a manifestation of his social issues. The panel decided 
on an intervention process which finding family and mental health support for the boy’s mother 
to relieve him of the pressures of care, and finding the boy a new school where he would receive 
pastoral care.  
 
While the localisation of Prevent means that the intervention described by Baldét might not be 
fully generalisable,117 the intervention described above looks to the individual as the source of 
the problem. This is reflected in guidance for assessing cases. The document Channel Duty 
Guidance provided by the government to Channel panel members outlines how panel members 
should assess referrals. Panels assess whether an individual needs Channel support by assessing 
them against a “Vulnerability Assessment Framework” which includes 22 indicators broken 
down into three dimensions:  
 
• Engagement with a group, cause or ideology;  
• intent to cause harm;  
• and Capability to cause harm.118  
 
These engagement factors are described as ‘psychological hooks’ that ‘include needs, 
susceptibilities, motivations and contextual influences [that] together map the individual 
pathway into terrorism.’119 The intent is referred to as a mindset that is associated with a 
readiness to use violence and capability is referred to in the context of skills, networks and 
ability to carry out terrorist activity. The document further outlines that it is not simply an 
association with extremist groups that trigger a referral, but that the individual must show a set 
of “vulnerabilities” that indicate a risk of being involved in terrorist activity. The 
“psychological hooks” described in the risk assessment framework refer mainly to needs, 
desires and social contexts which are highly individualised.120  
 
These assessments and interventions create a material basis for ideology. While only eleven, 
the child in Baldét’s narrative is conceptualized as a failed liberal-capitalist subject - his 
extreme outbursts are traced back to his family being unable to care for themselves within the 
competitive neoliberal system. The problem of his extremism is not analysed in the context of 
an NHS unable to cope with the strain of cuts, a state which no longer provides adequate 
support to struggling families, and the mental strain of living in an increasingly competitive 
society.121 Instead, the problem is located in the individual, who is then fixed through 
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interventions. Individuals are analysed, and then provided with assistance in getting their life 
in line with the dominant ideology – those struggling with healthcare, housing, jobs, or 
relationships are given appropriate assistance. Thus, the intervention enacts the idea that it is 
the individual that is the problem. Those struggling with housing are not helped by the 
provision of extra social housing for all, or rent caps, or any other social and political initiatives 
that would tackle the underlying causes of these issues. Similarly, the Channel guidance creates 
a framework of looking at individuals outside of the surrounding social and political 
environment.122  
 
As this framework is used to assess the vulnerability of referrals, it creates a situation where 
the action is framed around individuals, and thus a material process is enacted whereby the 
individual is inscribed within ideology as being unable to function. This process is backed by 
the Prevent duty, creating an impetus for ideological enactment. Public sector workers subject 
to the Prevent duty are legally obliged to pay due regard to Prevent, meaning that if they wish 
to keep their jobs, they are forced to think within this framework. Even if they do not believe 
in Prevent, they must enact it. While resistance can come in the form of non-compliance, 
surrounding economic and social conditions, and the overall lack of union power, have thus far 
rendered such activities marginal. As such, the way Prevent is built provides a material basis 
for the enactment and reproduction of liberal ideology. 
 
Interpellation: Public communications and Prevent referrals 
 
Referrals to Channel are made when someone thinks that someone else is vulnerable to getting 
involved in terrorism. When making these referrals, details of a person will be passed to a local 
safeguarding officer, or directly to the Prevent team. The individual will then be assessed 
according to the Vulnerability Assessment Framework criteria, and if necessary escalated to 
the next level. If the concern is great enough, the individual will be assessed at a Channel panel 
made up of local safeguarding, police, and statutory professionals, including mental health and 
social work professionals.123 If the individual's vulnerability is great enough to warrant an 
intervention, a bespoke package will be put together to mitigate those vulnerabilities, and that 
individual will be invited to engage with Channel on a voluntary basis. Should they turn down 
this offer, their case will likely be referred to other safeguarding services or the police.124 
Referral details, even when no action was warranted, are kept on the system for lengthy periods. 
Despite these records being confidential, they have been shared with universities and used in 
family court proceedings.125 
 
Althusser’s model for interpellation is simple. For a person to be interpellated, they need to 
recognise themselves in the call being made. At that moment, they are integrated into the 
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ideological system as a subject. Many studies have looked at the stigma and labelling effect of 
a police visit. The fact that you are suspect is internalised, your potential criminalization within 
the system is noted, and others begin to see you in that way too, reinforcing this notion.126 This 
has also been noted in studies on Prevent.127 In the case of Prevent, the interpellation is 
reinforced by the fact that a referee is not simply being called out to, but being actively 
addressed and assigned a label. Being referred to Prevent draws you into an ideological web 
where you are not just a potential (or actual) extremist, but also a vulnerable person whose 
agency is under question. The sticking power of this label is increased by the fact that upon 
referral, the name of the referee is entered into a database which may or may not be shared 
with others in the future.128 Refusal of the label, or the intervention, might land a referee in a 
worse situation, in that they are referred to other safeguarding services, or the police, which 
could enact more punitive measures against them. This is the coercive side of Prevent, where 
the state can marshal resources to push someone towards the “right” decision. 
 
However, there is also an offer implicit in Prevent. One does not have to comply with Prevent. 
Nominally there are no criminal consequences for refusing, although this might result in further 
assessments of risk, possibly by the police129. Coercion is then not absolute, and thus Prevent 
must offer something as an incentive. One offer that Prevent can make is material – accepting 
the referral might confer benefits. Prevent interventions can include help with finding a job or 
a house, help with education, or accessing mental health services. These are scarce resources 
in a neoliberal and austerity society, and thus can be difficult to turn down if one is in need. 
However, to receive benefits the subject has to not only recognise that they are the subject of 
the call, but also to positively answer it. They have to admit they “have a problem”, and thus 
this locates both themselves and their problem outside of the normal bounds of society, and 
within the bounds of extremist ideology. The program they buy into also creates a get-out for 
liberalism. While liberalism might have made the extremist in the first place, by entering 
Prevent the subject is tacitly accepting the diagnosis of the system, absolving liberalism, and 
locating the problem within the self. The further outcome of this, after a successful 
intervention, would be that the subject then identifies with the system itself. In this sense, the 
subject is invited to both accept that they are an extremist subject that has no place in liberal 
society, as well as being handed an olive branch of reformation. They are offered both a 
judgement and penance, and having completed their intervention can then enter into wider 
society as an acceptable subject. In this sense, the intervention both recognises and offers 
recognition. This does not mean that the subject then has to be liberal; rather, they just have to 
be functional. The subject can be cynical, so long as they accept their place so that they now 
fit into society at large and function effectively.  
 
These interpellations function on a wider level in Prevent communications, albeit with a 
different contextual and coercive edge. National level communications in Prevent tend to be 
related to raising awareness of the program, the dangers of radicalization and extremism, and 
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the signs to look out for.130 Sometimes these communications target a specific demographic, 
such as mothers, or Muslim youth.131 Other times they are more general and raise awareness 
without specific demographic markers or contexts. But in each case, the communications are 
directed to a subject; an unaware subject by whose ignorance extremism can thrive and 
radicalization can occur. The “Hey! You!” of these messages then creates an anxious or 
amateur subject. Radicalization is formulated as the domain of experts, and something which 
one needs to be aware of. The latter is reinforced by the implicit threat that if a person does not 
pay attention and report concerns, then they might find that someone they care about becomes 
radicalized and is imprisoned or even killed through involvement in extremism or terrorism. 
Thus that person should not question, but rather trust the authorities to safeguard that person.132 
The authorities here are positioned as experts, and as persons who can help. These two factors 
together interpellate the subject into a system where authority is good, and the questioning of 
authority can result in danger to loved ones. Thus this also places ideology outside of political 
contestation – it simply needs to be referred to when it emerges, and it will be taken care of.133  
 
These communications also call out to the “good” in society. Many of the communications do 
not only warn of the dangers of radicalization. Prevent communications show that alongside 
encouraging referrals, an idea of the “good” citizen is also relayed. Muslims in the UK are 
interpellated as “moderate” Muslims following a form of “British” Islam, an Islam which 
refuses all violence, emphasizes tolerance of all faiths, respects the rule of law, and is vocal in 
denouncing “extremism”. The Radical Middle Way roadshows, which sought to promote 
moderate Islamic theology, and the #MakingAStand campaign seeking out British Muslim 
women to publicly denounce ISIS, are illustrative of this.134 These campaigns called out to 
Muslims in Britain with an acceptable subjectivity, a way of demonstrating that they truly are 
“one of us”. Likewise, the Prevent Tragedies campaign, and many similar campaigns targeting 
mothers, called out with a “good mother” subjectivity. These campaigns make strong 
implications about what a good mother is, and how if one is a good mother, then radicalization 
will not happen. The good mother in these communications is a woman who knows best what 
her children are up to; holds her children close and cares deeply for them; is listened to in the 
family, and able to use superior communication skills to persuade against bad decisions.135 
This is a fairly stereotypical archetype and one against which women across the UK are tested. 
In each case, Prevent provides a subjectivity to identify with. Identifying with this provides a 
person with a place in society, allows them to “fit in” and gives them a role to play. Thus 
interpellation is not just coercive – it has an offer within it.  
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The voluntary nature of the policy reinforces this interpellative offering.136 It is not required to 
identify with repressive apparatus – you simply do what they say because otherwise, you might 
get hurt. The ideological apparatus instead thrives on voluntary compliance. Each moment of 
voluntary engagement reduces barriers to further engagement and increases the likelihood that 
the individual will begin to see themselves in the policy. Eventually, they will fully identify 
with it, seeing the state as the correct authority for managing everyday life. Ideology then no 
longer is ideology but self, and actions become natural. The reformed subject, and the British 
Muslim, can take respective pride in their rejection of extremism and their fitting in with British 
society. The good mother knows that while she might have sacrificed in taking care of children, 
she is nonetheless both a good mother in the social sense, but also a good mother protecting 
her children from extremism. Once these subjectivities become internalised, they become 
socially and individually invested in, and it then becomes difficult to think outside of this 
ideological framework. This is a particularly important function of Channel. By keeping the 
programme voluntary, accepting a Channel intervention creates a moment where the subject 
tacitly accepts authority and the label of vulnerable or extremist. This creates a self-
identification with the label, which becomes something that is no longer forced on the subject 
but freely accepted. At the same time, it also creates distance from the label, being something, 
which is not any longer a product of choice but rather a symptom of vulnerability. It becomes 




This article has argued that Prevent is an illustrative example of Althusser’s Ideological State 
Apparatus theory. As a policy that looks to stop persons from turning to terrorism, Prevent’s 
various components map well to the different aspects of Althusser’s theory. In particular, 
examples show how ideology can come to have a material base through the Prevent duty and 
by making referrals to Prevent and the Channel programme. This embeds ideology within 
public services. We also show how miscognition can occur through mandatory training and 
delivery of Prevent objectives in schools, which creates an idea of extremist and non-extremist 
persons, and British subjects, which are historically and logically invalid. Finally, we argue 
that Channel and public Prevent communications interpellate subjects through both material 
incentives and an “offer” to be part of British society, either as a reformed subject or as a 
“good” citizen, a “good” Muslim, a “good” mother, and so on. This article has also attempted 
to utilize Prevent as a case study to clarify and expand on Althusser’s theory. Here we have 
argued that interpellation can have coercive aspects, but this is not the primary cause of the 
turn – rather, as interpellation is nominally voluntary, there must be an offer implicit in the call. 
This offer can be to give space for a subject to exist in the social order, or to protect and provide 
for that person. How Prevent provides positive subjectivities is exemplary of this.  
 
We also demonstrate that research needs to move beyond analysing whether or not Prevent 
“works” or not. Prevent may or may not work as a counterterrorism policy – to debate this is 
to miss the point. Prevent works as an ideological strategy that produces subjects and shapes 
the contours of our political life. It carves out space for us to exist in, interpellating us as 
subjects, as well as forging a zone within which politics is no longer supposed to take place. 
To fall within this space is to be an extremist which opens oneself up to more repressive forms 
of policing. This latter space also needs to be investigated further, to see how resistance 
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functions within an ISA framework. These “bad subjects” and misinterpellations could not be 
explored here but would be worthwhile exploring in future work, uncovering both how Prevent 
seeks to deal with these cases, and how resistance to the policy functions within the ISA 
framework.   
 
This latter point also develops the study of Prevent by placing criticism of the policy as racist, 
Islamophobic, repressive or “thought policing” within a wider ideological framework. These 
individual critiques might be correct de facto in that Prevent focuses on minorities and 
Muslims. However de jure it is not correct, as Prevent itself works hard to be inclusive and 
emphasize that minorities and Muslims are not the problem. It is the ideology that Prevent 
supports that is the problem, and thus studies that look at, for example, Islamophobia in Prevent 
need to also uncover how the dominant ideology in Britain is Islamophobic, and how Prevent 
relates to that. This will allow for a critique that moves beyond reformation and towards a re-
politicization of counterterrorism, and feed into a wider discussion of the political problems of 
society and how to overcome them.  
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